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Abstract. 
Reasoning under uncertainty is basic to any artificial intelligence system designed to emulate 
human decision making.  This paper analyzes the problem of judgments or preferences 
subsequent to initial analysis by autonomous agents in a hierarchical system. We first examine 
a method where comparisons between two alternatives are made across different groups, and 
we show that this method reduces instances of preference reversal of the kind encountered in 
Simpson’s paradox. It is also shown that comparing across all permutations gives better results 
than exhaustive pairwise comparison. We next propose a method where the preference 
weights are recomputed based on relative group size values and show that it works well. This 
problem is also of interest for preventing fraud where the data that was obtained all together is 
presented in groups in a  manner that supports a hypothesis that is reverse of the one valid for 
the entire group. We also discuss judgments where more than two choices are involved. 
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Introduction 
In artificial intelligence systems, decisions must be made after initial processing of the raw data 
that reduces its dimensions through appropriate methods of representation [1][2]. The look-
ahead human reasoning is accomplished under conditions of uncertainty and that needs to be 
emulated by artificial agents [3], where the logic is so designed that it mitigates the effects of 
the uncertainty.  
 
Here we consider the situation where the uncertainty is specifically concerning the sizes of the 
groups and the decision is to choose between alternatives.  Such decision making is also a 
characteristic of responses to surveys and voting systems where the respondents’ decision is 
made based on prior bias or incomplete information. Probability computations based on 
frequency of an outcome on a small group can change when data from more than one cohort 
are aggregated, as is true of the Simpson’s paradox [4][5].  
 
This problem is significant in human decision making and responses to surveys because of 
uncertainty of knowledge and aspects related to attention [6][7]. Cognitive processing may also 
lead to preference reversal [8][9]. Human judgments may be modeled to have a superpositional 
component that is quite like a quantum system [10][11][12] that provides insight into human 
decision making as in the disjunction effect. It should be noted that this comes with associated 
limitations [13][14]. 
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This paper considers agents in a hierarchical system where the higher level must choose 
between alternatives where it does not possess all the data that went in the alternatives picked 
by the lower level agents. It is shown how a strategy of mixing inputs from different agents and 
having the lower agents work in the size discrepancies in their preferences can improve the 
decision by the higher agent. A method to recompute the preferences is also presented and it is 
shown that it improves the higher level agent results. 
 
The Hierarchical Decision System 
Consider the hierarchical information system of Figure 1, in which the decision by D is made on 
partially processed data by agents A1 through An.  
 
                          
                            Figure 1. A hierarchical decision-system 
 
Let the raw data arriving at the agents A1 through An be called Mi. Agent i performs Oi so that it 
obtains Ui: 
 
 Oi(Mi) = Ui 
 
and, doing so, reduces the dimensions and size of the data. The higher level decision agent, D, 
operates on the Ui and obtains Jk, k=1, 2, for a binary preference system: 
 
         Jk = S(U1,U2, …, Un), k=1, 2 
 
 To provide an example, assume that there are 3 agents that receive information on 
performance in trials related to two treatments, that we call Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, 
respectively. Table 1 gives the data on the results: 
 
                     Table 1. An experiment with three agents 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Totals 
Treatment 1 0.00 (0/1) 0.75 (3/4) 0.60 (3/5) 0.60 (6/10) 
Treatment 2 0.20 (1/5) 1.00 (1/1) 0.75 (3/4) 0.50 (5/10) 
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Each agent judges Treatment 2 to be superior. The frequency differences are substantial and 
equal to 0.20, 0.25, and 0.15, respectively. However, when the preferences of the three agents 
are aggregated by the higher decision agent, Treatment 1 scores over Treatment 2 by 0.10 
points. 
 
The preference reversal is due to the that if  𝑎𝑎1
𝑏𝑏1
>  𝑐𝑐1
𝑑𝑑1
, 𝑎𝑎2
𝑏𝑏2
>  𝑐𝑐2
𝑑𝑑2
 and 𝑎𝑎3
𝑏𝑏3
>  𝑐𝑐3
𝑑𝑑3
 there will be 
“pathological” situations so that and 𝑐𝑐1+𝑐𝑐2+𝑐𝑐3
𝑑𝑑1+𝑑𝑑2+𝑑𝑑3
>  𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎2+𝑎𝑎3
𝑏𝑏1+𝑏𝑏2+𝑏𝑏3
 . In general, there would be such 
“pathological” cases irrespective of the number of such inequalities.  
 
The numbers involved for each of the agents is kept small just for convenience and there could 
be larger numbers of the kind encountered in testing for efficacy of one treatment over 
another, or comparison with a placebo [15]. Typically, the cohorts in such testing do not have 
identical size because many volunteers drop out before the treatment has run its course or due 
to the difficulty of getting the volunteers to enlist. 
 
For a larger example, see Table 2, where the data is in terms of six sets of groups (dealt with by 
different agents). For each of the agents Treatment 2 is superior to Treatment 1 by margins that 
range from 0.04 to 0.13, but when the data is aggregated by the higher level decision agent, 
Treatment 1 scores over Treatment 2 by a margin of 0.06 
. 
               Table 2. An experiment with six agents 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4 Agent 5 Agent 6 Totals 
Treatment 1 0.62 
(5/8) 
0.85 
(23/27) 
0.60 
(15/24) 
0.84 
(68/81) 
0.69 
(55/80) 
0.87 
(234/270) 
0.82 
(400/490) 
Treatment 2 0.73 
(19/26) 
0.89 
(8/9) 
0.73 
(57/78) 
0.85 
(23/27) 
0.73 
(192/263) 
0.93 
(81/87) 
0.76 
(380/490) 
 
The frequency of occurrence of Simpson’s paradox is known for different assumptions made 
about the data. In in a random 2 × 2 × 2 table with uniform distribution, the paradox occurs 
with a probability of 1/60 [16], whereas in random path models under certain conditions it is a 
bit higher than 1/8 [17].  Further issues about preference reversal arise that are discussed in 
[18],[19]. 
 
In general, if the decision agent D has data in categories provided as in Table 3. Let si be the 
outcomes out of a total of ei for Treatment 1 and pi  be the corresponding outcomes out of a 
total of fi for Treatment 2, where the outcome is to be interpreted as the proportion of subjects 
who improved within the cohort. 
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                 Table 3. Agent preferences represented directly 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 …… Agent n 
Treatment  1 s1/g1 s2/g2 …… sn/gn 
Treatment 2 p1/h1 p2/h2 …… pn/hn 
 
It is natural to have the following decision system: 
 
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖/𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 > ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 /ℎ𝑖𝑖, then Treatment 1 > Treatment 2 
 
When n>2, the decision may also be made by majority logic.  
 
These ideas are also relevant to voting schemes {20][21][22], where si/gi and pi/hi represent 
preference values for the two different outcomes. 
 
Comparisons across Sets 
We first consider comparison in pairs, allowing switching of the responses. We see that 
between agents 1 and 2 the data becomes  
 
0.00 (0/1) 0.75 (3/4) 
0.20 (1/5) 1.00 (1/1) 
 
which when switched yields a result of 1 -1. Likewise, for 2 and 3, it yields  
 
0.75 (3/4) 0.60 (3/5) 
1.00 (1/1) 0.75 (3/4) 
 
This is one tie and 2 better in one case. For 1 and 3, we have 
 
0.00 (0/1) 0.60 (3/5) 
0.20 (1/5) 0.75 (3/4) 
 
This again yields a tie. 
 
So switching data in pairs shows that preferences for Treatment 2 and Treatment 1 are not that 
different in their efficacy. 
 
In comparison across sets, the decision agent D at the higher level uses not just the preference 
values that have been provided to it for that specific group. Therefore, if the outputs of the 
Agents 1, 2, and 3 are called A1, B1, C1, respectively in favor of Treatment 1, and A2, B2, C2, 
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respectively, in favor of Treatment 2, then they should be compared with each other in all 
possible arrangements, of which there will be 6 in this example. In other words A1, B1, C1 should 
be compared not only with A2, B2, C2 but also with  
 
A2, C2, B2  
B2, C2, A2 
B2, A2, C2 
C2, A2, B2 
C2, B2, A2 
 
The full table for our example will be as follows in Table 4, where the first row represents 
frequency values for Treatment 1 for the three cohorts and the remaining rows represent 
the frequency values for Treatment 2 in different permutations with respect to Treatment 
1. 
             
            Table 4. Comparison across groups 
0 0.36 0.75 
0.20 0.60 1.00 
0.20 1.00 0.60 
1.00 0.20 0.60 
1.00 0.60 0.20 
0.60 1.00 0.20 
0.60 0.20 1.00 
  
We see that when the comparisons are made in all arrangements, Treatment 2 scores 12 out of 
18 times (the recomputed values are shown in bold). Therefore, its favorability is not as 
absolute as when shown in Table 1.  
 
More than two alternatives 
We now consider multiple alternatives. Consider 3 alternatives as below in Table 5 where the 
total number of subjects is not the same in the two groups; however the number of subjects for 
testing each alternative is the same. 
 
                                      Table 5. Example with three alternatives 
 Group 1 Group 2 Totals 
A 1/10 (0.10) 69/90 (0.77) 70/100 (0.70) 
B 10/50 (0.20) 40/50 (0.80) 50/100 (0.50) 
C 22/80 (0.27) 18/20 (0.90) 40/100 (0.40) 
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Even though the best performance for data aggregated across the groups is for A, followed by B 
and C (see third column of Table 5), the results are reversed within each group, so that for each 
of them separately, C scores the highest, followed by B and A, in that order.  
 
Accounting for difference in group samples 
We seek a function that leaves the preferences unchanged if the sample size is equal to the 
mean or is larger, and penalizes preferences obtained from samples that are smaller than the 
mean, with the penalty increasing as the departure from the mean becomes larger. Many 
different functions may be used; here we propose one that corresponds to Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          Figure 1. Recomputation function shape 
 
If the preference weight s is obtained from the group of size g (where the mean of all the 
groups is gm), then its value should be adjusted for the differences in group sizes in this general 
form: 
            𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 = � 1,                        𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−𝑊𝑊(𝑔𝑔−𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚),      𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑔𝑔 < 𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚                                                    (1) 
 
where W(g-gm) is some appropriate function and where k is some suitably chosen constant. An 
attractive choice of this function is in equation (2) for it is quadratic and it gives us the value of 
1 at the edge of g = gm: 
 
𝑊𝑊(𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚) =  𝛿𝛿(𝑔𝑔 − 𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚)2 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑔𝑔                                                                              (2) 
 
But here, for convenience, we use a δ= ½, k=1, so that equation (1) transforms into  
            𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 = �1,                                           𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑔𝑔 ≥ 𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−(𝑔𝑔−𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚)2/2𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,      𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑔𝑔 < 𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚                                             (3) 
 
Thus we see that the recomputation weight is 𝑒𝑒−0.5𝑣𝑣2if the g is v standard deviations away from 
the mean. So if the test size is one standard deviation away, the preference value should be 
mean 
Sample size 
Multiplies for frequency 
1 
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reduced by 0.60; if it is 2 standard deviations away, it should be reduced by 0.14; for 3 standard 
deviations away, by 0.011, and so on. 
 
In general, the choice of the function may be based on the nature of the data so that the 
comparison between the preferences is intuitively satisfactory. But the problem of alternative 
recomputation functions shall not be considered here. 
 
Given equation (1), we now recompute the preference frequencies of Tables 1, 2 and 4. In Table 
1, the values of Agent 1 require no change since the first is 0 and the second is for a group 
whose size exceeds the mean of 3. For Agent 2, the first row is fine as 4 is larger than the mean 
of 2.5. The variance is 8.5-6.25 = 2.25 and so the second entry will become exp(-1.52/2 ×2.25 = 
0.60. The second entry for Agent 3, likewise becomes 0.75× exp(-0.52/2×0.25) = 0.45 (since the 
variance for 4 and 5 is 0.25). 
 
                     Table 6. Recomputed preference frequencies using Equation (3)  
 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 
Treatment 1 0.00 (0/1) 0.75 (3/4) 0.60 (3/5) 
Treatment 2 0.20 (1/5) 0.36 (1/1) 0.45 (3/4) 
 
The recomputed values are shown in bold. We find that for Agent 1, Treatment 2 remains 
superior; Treatment 1 is much better for Agents 2 and 3. This is satisfactory analysis and quite 
in agreement with our intuition. 
 
Table 7. Recomputing of Table 2 preferences (recomputed values are bold) 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4 Agent 5 Agent 6 
Treatment 1 0.38 
(5/8) 
0.85 
(23/27) 
0.36 
(15/24) 
0.84 
(68/81) 
0.42 
(55/80) 
0.87 
(234/270) 
Treatment 2 0.73 
(19/26) 
0.54 
(8/9) 
0.73 
(57/78) 
0.52 
(23/27) 
0.73 
(192/263) 
0.56 
(81/87) 
 
Unlike for the original data where Treatment 2 scored over Treatment 1 for all the agents, now 
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are tied 3-3, which is much more reasonable and not likely to be 
misinterpreted. 
 
Now let us consider the example with three alternatives of Table 5. The data of Group 1 has a 
mean of 46.66, therefore the recomputation is required to be done only for the entry for A, 
whereas the data for Group 2 has a mean of 53.33, so we must recompute values for B and C; 
note the variances are 2177 and 8156, respectively. With this information, we can use Equation 
3 to revise the figures and these are in Table 8. 
8 
 
 
                          Table 8. Recomputing Table 5 preference values 
 Group 1 Group 2 
A 1/10 (0.098) 69/90 (0.77) 
B 10/50 (0.20) 40/50 (0.68) 
C 22/80 (0.27) 18/20 (0.88) 
 
Once again, it provides preferences results that are superior to those where the raw data is 
used, as done earlier. 
 
Lastly, we take a new example of choice between 3 alternatives, where the raw figures are 2/4, 
3/7 and 4/10, with corresponding preference values of 0.5, 0.43, and 0.40. The mean of the 
group sizes is 7 and the variance is 6. We can now obtain the corrections to the figures for 
group that is smaller than the mean, which is the first one. After correction, its value drops to 
0.416 and now we find it is not the best of the three.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the problem of arriving at probability judgments subsequent to initial 
analysis by autonomous agents in a hierarchical system. From the perspective of the higher 
agent, this represents the problem of decision making under a degree of uncertainty, which is 
typical in big data with lower-level processing farmed out to different contractors. We propose 
a method where the comparisons are made across different cohorts, and we show that this 
reduces instances of preference reversal of the kind encountered in Simpson’s paradox. It is 
also shown that comparing across all permutations gives better results than exhaustive pairwise 
comparison. We also propose a method where the preference weights are recomputed based 
on relative group size values.  
 
The problem of preference reversal is also of interest for preventing fraud where the data that 
was obtained all together is manipulated [20] and presented in groups in a  manner that 
supports a hypothesis that is reverse of the one valid for the entire group. It is also of interest in 
economic systems where one is interested in why agents behave in a particular fashion 
[21][22]. It is also of interest in voting systems where such voting is cast independently in 
different groups, as would be the case in surveys. 
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